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STATEMENT Or JURlSbi.CT1G&! 
Th i s appe a 1 I s t a ken. pu r si 1 a nt: t o t he p r o v i s i o ns o f 
Rule 3 ( a ) , "U'tah Rules of Appellate procedure, from two orders 
of summary judgment entered in the court below. The first of 
. r . r.i- • - .- . -itered " :i day of March, ] 987, and the 
second d*.. '*:,..* *- . * • ^ ^ e j on the ] 5th day of 
September i ^ J final order was certified by the court 
-. , provi s:i ons c: 
Kuie b4B i i *~ s: dh K O I H > ^r •. —*n ;. Procedure. 
STATEMENT Of ISSUES PRESENTED BUR REVIEW 
There are two issues presented for review in this case, 
1. • Did the court err :i n ; ^ Mnq that the cl aims of 
L.A. Young Sons Construction Company,, were not covered by the 
payment bond furnished by the defendant, Reliance Insurance 
Company? . 
2. Die1 ' ' ' _ ' •" elding that funds i n an 
escrnw a r m ,r 1 ->^<* . - -)v HI
 r 'jr^em^nt between th-- plaintiff 
• 
t "IP defendai T R e l i a n c e i n s u i o a e e company/ 
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STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE, 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, 
regulations, rules, and ordinances whose interpretation will 
determine the deposition of the case are as follows: 
BOND STATUTE 
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on public 
projects - Conditions and terms. 
(1) Before any contract for the construction, 
alteration or repair of any public building, public work or 
public improvement of the state or its political subdivisions 
is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the 
appropriate political entity the following bonds: 
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of 
the price specified in the contract, solely for the 
protection of persons supplying labor or materials to 
the contractor or his subcontractors for the 
performance of work provided for in the contract. 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to 
the contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the 
contract for which a payment bond is furnished under this 
chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days from the 
date on which the last of the* labor was performed or material 
was supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond 
for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue 
on he contract for the amount due.* 
*These statutes were repealed by Senate Bill 183, 
Chapter 218, Laws of Utah, 1987. However, such act did not 
become effective until April 27, 1987; thus, the above section 
covered this contract. They were replaced by § 63-56-38, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) as enacted by Chapter 218, Laws of Utah, 
1987. Provisions of 63-56-38, however, so far as these 
particular provisions are concerned, is the same as the above 
quoted statute and so it would be immaterial as to which was 
applicable. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L.A. Young Sons Construction Company (a general 
contractor hereinafter called "Contractor") entered into a 
contract with the State of Utah to construct a portion of 
Highway 1-80 near the southern end of the Great Salt Lakec The 
defendant, Reliance Insurance Company, (hereinafter called 
"Surety") provided performance and payment bonds covering the 
contract. The Contractor leased certain heavy moving equipment 
from Transport Leasing Company and Transystems, Inc. 
(hereinafter called the "Truck Owner"). The lease agreement is 
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A". The equipment, 
consisting of trucks and belly dump type trailers, was to be 
used by the Contractor for moving fill material from an old 
smelter slag dump to the job site. The Contractor was to 
provide fuel for the trucks, labor for the driving of the 
trucks, and all services required in the operation of the 
trucks and the loading, weighing, and unloading of the trucks. 
The only personnel provided by the Truck Owners were two 
supervisors to look after the condition of the trucks. 
The leasing agreement provided that the State should 
issue separate checks covering the billings of the Truck Owner 
for services rendered under the contract, such checks to show 
the Contractor and the Truck Owner as joint payees. At the 
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time of the making of the second advance payment on the joint 
payee arrangement, the Contractor disputed the amount billed by 
the Truck Owner, both for rental and for repairs. Thereupon, 
the Truck Owner and the Contractor, by a joint document, 
created an escrow account with Continental Bank and Trust 
Company in Salt Lake City. That portion of the Truck Owner's 
bill which was not disputed by the Contractor was paid to the 
Truck Owner. The balance of the amount in the joint payee 
check went into the escrow account to be paid out on the joint 
order of the Truck Owner and the Contractor or on the order of 
a court of competent jurisdiction. Some subsequent payments 
were likewise paid partially to the Truck Owner and partially 
into the escrow account. On later payments on the job, the 
Contractor refused to conform to the joint payee arrangements 
and received one-party checks from the State of Utah and in 
turn paid the Truck Owner what the Contractor thought was due. 
At the completion of the job, the Truck Owner claimed 
that the Contractor owed it $53,276.00 for rental on the 
equipment and $149,855.61 for extraordinary repairs on the 
equipment over and above expected depreciation. At the time of 
the filing of the action, there was in the escrow account, 
including interest, $61,214.13. The account has continued to 
accumulate interest since the filing of the complaint. The 
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case has proceeded to this point on the basis of three summary 
judgments. 
1. A summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
granting judgment against both the Contractor and Surety for 
unpaid truck rental payments in the sum of $53,423.37. 
2. A summary judgment in favor of Reliance to the 
effect that the Surety's payment bond did not cover 
extraordinary repairs on plaintiff's equipment notwithstanding 
the terms of the equipment rental agreement* 
3. A summary judgment in favor of Reliance to the 
effect that Reliance was the owner of the funds in the escrow 
by right of subrogation. 
The paragraph of the equipment leasing agreement 
covering extraordinary damage to the truck reads as follows: 
In the event any of the leased equipment 
shall be damaged through the negligence of 
the Lessee or the Lessee's employees, the 
Lessee shall be responsible for the repair 
of such damage. The Lessee shall have the 
responsibility of maintaining the roads over 
which the leased equipment will be operated 
in a suitable condition so that unreasonable 
or excessive wear and tear to the leased 
units shall not result from the operation. 
Although the facts surrounding the activities 
resulting in extraordinary damage to the trucks and trailers 
are in dispute, as this judgment was given as a summary 
-6-
judgment/ we will hereinafter make reference to the plaintiffs' 
evidence in this regard as establishing the facts for these 
proceedings/ notwithstanding the fact that the defendants 
contest many of these factual matters. It is axiomatic that in 
considering a motion for summary judgment/ disputed issues of 
fact shall/ if supported by competent evidence, be resolved 
against the party moving for summary judgment. Also, all 
reasonable inferences shall be drawn in favor of the party 
resisting. 
The equipment furnished by the plaintiff was in good 
repair and was suitable for the job contemplated, had the 
Contractor conformed to ordinary practices in the* industry and 
to procedures which the Contractor had represented to the Truck 
Owner would be followed. The Contractor, however, not long 
into the job, abandoned the agreed-upon and normally followed 
procedures and engaged in certain practices which cut the 
Contractor's cost but resulted in extensive damage to the Truck 
Owner's equipment. The activities engaged in by the Contractor 
are as follows: 
1. It had been agreed that the Contractor would 
screen the slag material being loaded so that material loaded 
on the Truck Owner's equipment would not exceed 12 inches in 
diameter. The screening procedure, however, slowed down the 
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loading and hauling process so the Contractor abandoned the 
screening and loaded the slag material out of the slag dumps 
directly onto the Truck Owner's equipment. Chunks of slag as 
large as four feet long and weighing as much as 6,000 pounds 
were loaded into the Truck Owner's trailers, extensively 
damaging the trailers' bodies during loading and tearing out 
the dump control equipment as the slag was unloaded through the 
belly dumps. (See depositions of Homer Tell Runkle and Thomas 
A. Paluso.) 
2. Standard practice in the industry called for the 
using of front-end loaders of a size and height that would 
result in the material loaded being dropped only a distance of 
approximately 10 feet before hitting the bed of the trailer. 
The Contractor, however, in order to speed up the loading 
procedure, used much larger front-end loaders than would 
ordinarily be used in the industry, thus dropping the material 
as much as 13-1/2 feet. This extra drop, combined with the 
unexpected heavy and large chunks of material being loaded, 
resulted in extraordinary damage to the Truck Owner's 
equipment. (See deposition of Homer Tell Runkle and Thomas A. 
Paluso). 
3. Notwithstanding the requirement of the equipment 
leasing agreement that the roads over which the leased 
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equipment was to be operated were to be maintained by the 
Contractor in a suitable condition "so that unreasonable or 
excessive wear and tear to the leased units shall not result 
from the operation," the Contractor failed to so maintain the 
roads and dragged the trailers over excessively rough roads and 
over large material already dumped/ with the result that the 
undercarriage of the trucks and trailers was excessively 
damaged and in many cases the undertrailer control mechanism 
entirely torn away. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the position of appellants that the court 
erroneously applied the law to factual situations in the case 
as follows: 
1. The court held that while the Contractor may be 
responsible to the Truck Owner for extraordinary wear and tear 
to the equipment/ the Surety was not. The court seemed to rely 
heavily on cases cited by the Surety to the effect that claims 
for negligence against the Contractor were not within the 
bond. We do not quarrel with these cases generally but feel 
that the determining factor is not whether the damage occurred 
through the negligence of the Contractor but whether or not the 
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repairs of the damage contributed and went into the performance 
of the project. It is true that the term "negligence" is used 
in the leasing agreement to characterize the type of 
extraordinary damages for which the Contractor is obligated to 
repair. However, the use of that term, inadvertently or 
otherwise, does not automatically disqualify claims for the 
repairs from coverage by the bond. The test is whether the 
repairs contributed to and went into the performance of the 
construction of the project. We will cite cases in the body of 
the argument to the effect that the use of "negligence" to 
characterize such claim does not disqualify them. Furthermore, 
it should be kept in mind in this instance that these damages 
were inflicted on the Truck Owner's property in order to avoid 
other costs i.e., screening, slower loading, grading on 
approach roads which would be in the coverage of the bond if 
they had been performed as agreed. In other words, the 
Contractor attempted to cut costs by shifting part of such 
costs to the Truck Owner's equipment. It is, therefore, our 
position that it is within the bond. 
2. The court erred in holding that the money in the 
escrow became the property of the Surety because it has paid 
claims to various subcontractors and materialmen on behalf of 
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the Contractor, although it has paid nothing as yet to the 
Truck Owner. If the first assignment of error as above is 
decided in favor of the Truck Owner, this point will become 
moot as the Truck Owner will be able to recover its entire 
judgment from the Surety and will not need the escrow fund as a 
source of satisfying a judgment against the Contractor. 
However, if the Surety is not liable for the repair bill, then 
the Contractor should be able to apply the escrow funds on that 
bill and proceed against the Surety on its summary judgment on 
the bills for rental. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CLAIMS FOR 
REPAIRS TO THE TRUCK OWNER'S EQUIPMENT ARE NOT 
COVERED BY THE PAYMENT BOND. 
The Surety argued in the court below that although the 
Contractor may be liable to the Truck Owner for the 
extraordinary damages, as such claims arise from breach of 
contract or negligence, they are not covered by the bond. The 
cases cited by the Surety in the court below, however, did not 
go to the basic point, that being whether or not the repairs 
for which the Truck Owner is seeking to be paid actually may be 
considered as going into the project. 
We agree that a claim arising under a construction 
contract or due to a contractor's negligence may be good 
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against the contractor and not good against the Surety, even 
though it arises out of the construction contract or even 
though the negligence is incident to the performance of the 
contract« However, we do not agree, as the Surety asserted and 
the court below held, that damages are automatically excluded 
from the coverage of the bond iust because they arise "as a 
result of breach of contract" or iust because they are "due to 
the negligence of the Contractor." The test is whether the 
recovery being sought is for items that went into and became 
part of the project. If so, they are recoverable. If not, 
they are not recoverable. 
This court has already held, in accord with the great 
weight of authority in this country, that repairs to equipment 
performing the work may be considered as going into the project 
and thus recoverable from a surety. Tolton v. Maryland 
Company, 293 P. 611. The court below acknowledged this but 
held that as a matter of law, as the Truck Owner was 
responsible for ordinary wear, tear, and depreciation, and as 
the claims here being disputed were for extraordinary wear and 
tear resulting from the negligence of the Contractor, as a 
matter of law, no claim for repairs could be recovered under 
the bond. It should be kept in mind that was on a motion for 
summary judgment where all disputes of fact and all inferences 
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from disputed fact should be resolved in favor of the Truck 
Owner. 
The Surety below cited no case comparable to the set 
of facts in this case. The Truck Owner, the appellant here, 
relied principally upon a case which appears to be directly in 
point. That case is Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino 
Construction Co., 363 F.2d 108. The facts are strikingly 
similar to the case now before this court. It is true that 
this case was interpreting the federal Miller Act. However, 
the Miller Act is in all respects similar to our state 
statute. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Every person who has furnished labor or 
material in the prosecution of the work 
provided for in such contract, in respect of 
which a payment bond is furnished . . . 
shall have the right to sue on such payment 
bond . . . . (40 U.S.C. 270b) 
The contractual provision in the Moran case is 
strikingly similar to the contractual language in this case as 
quoted above, even to the extent of using the term "negligence" 
to describe the extraordinary damages to the equipment which 
was held to be within the bond. In the Moran case, the 
contractual provision read as follows: 
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We [Moran] shall be responsible for all 
ordinary wear and tear to our vessel 
equipment due to the nature of the material 
to be transported but you [Gammino] shall be 
responsible for any damage to our vessel 
equipment due to your negligence, or for any 
damage to our vessel equipment whether or 
not due to your negligence that may be 
occasioned by loading or unloading of pieces 
weighing in excess of 1000 lbs. per piece.* 
In Moran the equipment in question, in addition to 
ordinary wear and tear, was damaged from a number of other 
factors which the court held were caused by the negligence of 
the lessee, Gammino. In fact, part of the damage was caused by 
actions almost identical with those now before this court. The 
scows in the Moran case, which have a lot of similarity to the 
belly dump trailers in this case, were badly damaged as a 
result of dumping large rock into them. Testimony in the Moran 
case was that custom in the industry called for lining the 
body; in other words, gently lowering the first layer of stone 
to cushion the fall of the others. In our case, testimony 
would be (see deposition of Thomas Tell Runkle) that custom 
would call for screening the material and for using a much 
smaller front-end loader than was actually used. 
*The contractual language is not quoted in the 
appellate court opinion. The above quote is taken from the 
reported opinion of the district court. Reported at 204 
F. Supp. 353. 
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The appellate court in Moran held that such damage was 
covered, the conclusion of the court being stated as follows: 
The present case stands in much the same 
posture. It is perhaps not an undue 
exaggeration to describe the Moran scows as 
having been "consumed" in the course of 
Gammino's use of them. Moreover, Gammino's 
acceptance of the obligation to pay for any 
excess wear and tear regardless of fault can 
properly be seen more as a form of 
compensation for their use than as a kind of 
insurance coverage. 
A CONTRACT OF A SURETY IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST SURETY. 
In Tolton, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated the 
rule: 
Our own court is committed to the rule that 
the contract of a surety, for hire, is to be 
strictly construed against the surety. 
This rule is the same as that followed by federal 
courts in applying the Miller Act which is being applied in the 
Moran case discussed above. In the case of United States v. 
Kelly, 192 F. Supp. 274 (Ark. 1961), the court stated: 
The reasoning of these cases is that the 
Miller Act is remedial in nature and is 
entitled to liberal construction to effect 
legislative intent to protect those whose 
labors and material go into public projects. 
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A SURETY IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE WHEN DAMAGES 
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE MAKE UP PART OF THE RENT, 
The cases cited by Reliance and the arguments of Reliance 
do not apply to the immediate case. Reliance argues that the 
surety is not generally liable for negligence* This general 
proposition is true. However, plaintiffs have included in their 
agreement with LAYS that LAYS will pay plaintiffs for all damages 
due to their misuse of plaintiffs' equipment. Plaintiffs knew 
that the equipment would be used for the hauling of a coarse slag 
material and provided for extra compensation in the event its 
equipment was damaged. Therefore, Reliance's liability does not 
arise from a general theory of negligence, but arises from the 
contract price or rental charged by plaintiffs for its providing 
"labor or materials". 
Certainly, on a motion for summary judgment based upon 
the pleadings and the facts as set forth in the depositions of the 
Truck Owners' witnesses, the Truck Owners, as the claimant and as 
the resistor of the motion for summary judgment, was entitled to 
the presumption that the extraordinary repairs went into and 
became part of the project. 
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II. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ESCROW FUNDS BELONGED TO THE SURETY BY 
RIGHT OF SUBROGATION. 
The escrow account was created by the Contractor and 
the Truck Owner. Neither the State nor the Surety were parties 
to that agreement and probably neither of them knew of the 
existence of the escrow until this litigation began. The 
monies that went into the escrow account arose from disputed 
billings as between Contractor and the Truck Owner. While the 
items in dispute which gave rise to the placing of the monies 
in the escrow account can be identified by checking back, the 
escrow account itself is a single account and does not 
segregate funds therein based upon what type of disputed 
billings gave rise to the deposit. The escrow account provides 
that it shall be disbursed by the escrow agent only on joint 
order of the Contractor and the Truck Owner or by order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
The court order does not identify as to whose rights 
the Surety became subrogated. Certainly, the Surety could gain 
no greater right to the funds than was possessed by the person 
to whose right they became subrogated. The basis of the right 
to subrogation is set forth concisely in the case of Pearlman 
v. Reliance Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132 9 L. Ed. 2d 190 at 
page 193 as follows: 
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And probably there are few doctrine better 
established than that a surety who pays the 
debt of another is entitled to all the 
rights of a person he paid to enforce his 
right to be reimbursed. 
The surety becomes subrogated to the rights of any three 
classes of claimants: (1) the contractor; (2) the owner of the 
project; or (3) persons supplying labor and materials on the 
project. This doctrine is set forth rather concisely in the 
case of Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 
411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) as follows: 
. . . But the surety in cases like this 
undertakes duties which entitled it to step 
into three sets of shoes. When, on default 
of the contractor, it pays all the bills of 
the job to date and completes the job, it 
stands in the shoes of the contractor 
insofar as there are receivables due it; in 
the shoes of laborers and materialmen who 
have been paid by the surety—who may have 
had liens; and, not least, in the shoes of 
the government, for whom the job was 
completed. 
As stated above, the court did not state to whose 
rights the Surety became subrogated. Certainly, not to the 
rights of the government as the government had paid the money 
and under no circumstances had any right to recover it; not to 
the rights of other lien claimants, as they would have no right 
to the escrowed monies as against the Truck Owner; and not to 
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the rights of the Contractor because a determination has not 
yet been made as to whether the Contractor is entitled to any 
of the money back. 
Whether or not the Surety is entitled to proceed 
against the escrowed funds for the amount of the summary 
judgment against the Surety to the amount of such summary 
judgment is dealt with later in this section. However, the 
court held that the Surety was entitled not only to recover 
from the escrow the amount it might at some future time have to 
pay to the Truck Owner on behalf of the Contractor but the 
court held it was entitled to the entire amount of the escrow 
by right of subrogation but fails to say subrogated to what 
rights or to whose rights. 
PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT RESORT TO THE ESCROW PRIOR TO 
SEEKING PAYMENT FROM RELIANCE. 
Plaintiffs need not resort to the escrow fund prior to 
seeking payment from Reliance. The rule is stated in 72 C.J.S. 
Principal and Surety 334 and cases cited therein:: 
Except where the suretyship contract 
provides otherwise, at common law a creditor 
ordinarily cannot be required, before 
proceeding against the surety, to resort to 
and exhaust collateral security held by him 
for payment of the indebtedness, or to 
proceed against other property of the 
principal which is subject to the 
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satisfaction of the debt, or to avail 
himself of other means of enforcement; nor 
can he be compelled to realize first on any 
particular one of several securities. 
The text goes on to say: 
If the creditor or obligee has received 
collateral security from the principal, 
without any stipulation that it is to be 
held for any particular debt, or holds any 
property of the principal, the creditor or 
obligee can apply it to debts for which the 
surety is not liable. 
Restatement of Security Page 355 131 provides: 
. . . a creditor who has a security interest 
in property of the principal may compel 
performance by the surety before resorting 
to the security interest. 
It is to the contractor's rights, if any, that the 
surety has become subrogated. The contractor has no right to 
get back any of the escrow money until its obligation to the 
Truck Owner has been paid in full. This is so even though the 
Surety may have paid part of the obligation of the contractor. 
A very old Utah case, Featherstone v. Emerson, 45 P. 713 (Utah 
1896) is in point here. The court stated: 
. . . As a general rule the right of 
subrogation cannot be enforced until the 
whole debt is paid or tendered to the 
creditor. Emerson should have extinguished 
the debt before invoking the remedy sought. 
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Until the creditor is paid, there cannot 
ordinarily be any interference with his 
security which might prejudice or embarrass 
him in collecting the balance of his claim. 
Another case involving a Utah party which has the same holding 
is the case of National Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d 
34 (8th Cir. 1925). The Federal Court stated: 
. . . The rule applicable to this situation 
seems to be fairly well settled. That rule 
is that, "The right of subrogation cannot be 
enforced until the whole debt is paid. And 
until the creditor be wholly satisfied, 
there ought and can be no interference with 
his rights or his securities, which might, 
even by bare possibility, prejudice or 
embarrass him in any way in the collection 
of the residue of his claim.1' 
So until the Truck Owner is paid in full by the contractor for 
all claims under the contract which were not covered by the 
Surety, the contractor would have no right to recover any of 
the money out of the escrow. As the contractor had no right, 
then there was nothing to which the Surety can become 
subrogated. The Truck Owner may execute directly against the 
Surety and reserve his right against the escrow fund to recover 
anything not recovered from the Surety. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is the position of 
the Truck Owners Plaintiffs below and Appellants here, that 
both of Surety's Motions for Summary Judgment should have been 
denied. In order to grant those Motions, the Court below would 
have had to have resolved all disputed questions of fact and 
all inferences therefrom most strongly in favor of the moving 
party. Such is in the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq. 
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